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NOTES
AN UNCOMMON STATE OF CONFUSION: THE COMMON




The threshold question in any securities litigation is whether the in-
strument at issue is a security. An investor seeking relief in court re-
quires an affirmative answer to this question before invoking the
protections of the Securities Acts.' An issuer or offeror of a security
may have a more urgent need to know if a particular transaction falls
within the purview of the Acts because failure to register a qualifying
security gives rise to potential liability even in the absence of fraud or
some other wrongful act.2 The applicability of the federal securities
laws also may determine the parties' access to the federal courts.3
Many important consequences, therefore, flow from the critical deter-
mination of whether a given instrument is a security.
With so much at stake, it is unfortunate that neither Congress nor
the courts have been able to arrive at a simple, easy-to-apply litmus
test on this question. The difficulty faced by Congress and the courts
stems from a paradox: To be applied consistently, the test of what
constitutes a security should be relatively simple and the outcome ca-
pable of accurate prediction so that effective business planning is pos-
sible. On the other hand, because neither Congress nor the courts can
1. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 22,48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 77a-bbbb) (1988)) [hereinafter "the 1933 Act"]; Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78a-l1 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)) [hereinafter "the 1934 Act"]. These statutes will be
referred to collectively as "the Securities Acts" or "the Acts."
2. Accordingly, § 77e(a) of the 1933 Act states:
Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be unlaw-
ful for any person, directly or indirectly-
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or commu-
nication in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security
through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise ....
15 U.S.C. § 77e (1988).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). In Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 738 (1824), Chief Justice Marshall interpreted the constitutionally permissi-
ble jurisdiction of the federal courts as follows: "If... the title or right set up by the
party, may be defeated by one construction of the constitution or law of the United
States, and sustained by the opposition construction," federal jurisdiction may prop-
erly be asserted. Id at 822. Thus, if the rights of the parties are determined by appli-




possibly foresee the entire multitude of schemes that people's profit
seeking ingenuity might devise, an overly simple test would be suscep-
tible to easy evasion or might not be flexible enough to cover instru-
ments designed in the future.'
The 1933 and 1934 Acts represent a Congressional compromise be-
tween these extremes. While acknowledging that some guidance is
necessary, Congress recognized that the remedial purposes underlying
the Acts might be undermined by an overly restrictive definition of a
security. The Acts therefore do not provide any comprehensive defi-
nition of the term "security." Rather, they provide a laundry list of
the most common securities instruments, including catch-all categories
such as "investment contract" designed to offset any omissions from
the list.' Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, for example,
provides:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or par-
ticipation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certifi-
cate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share,
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for
a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral
rights . . . or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly
known as a "security", or any certificate of interest or participation
in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.6
Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 tracks this
definition with one change.7 The 1933 and 1934 Act definitions, how-
ever, are considered to be functionally equivalent.'
4. In Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990), the Supreme Court noted:
An approach founded on economic reality rather than on a set of per se rules
is subject to the criticism that whether a particular note is a "security" may
not be entirely clear at the time it is issued. Such an approach has the corre-
sponding advantage, though, of permitting the SEC and the courts sufficient
flexibility to ensure that those who market investments are not able to es-
cape the coverage of the Securities Acts by creating new instruments that
would not be covered by a more determinate definition.
Id. at 63 n.2.
5. See Landreth T'Imber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 (1985) ("As we have
observed in the past, this definition [of "security"] is quite broad, and includes both
instruments whose names alone carry well-settled meaning, as well as instruments of
'more variable character [that] were necessarily designated by more descriptive
terms,' such as 'investment contract' and 'instrument commonly known as a secur-
ity.'" (alteration in original)(citations omitted) (quoting SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943)).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
7. "The term 'security' ... shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of
exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not
exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the matur-
ity of which is likewise limited." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988).
8. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 342 (1967).
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This Note is concerned with only one of the many listed instru-
ments, the investment contract. Although Congress included the term
"investment contract" in its laundry list of securities instruments, it
provided no more precise definition of the term, leaving further inter-
pretation to the courts. The Supreme Court has interpreted this in-
strument broadly to reach "[n]ovel, uncommon, or irregular devices,
whatever they appear to be."9 In effect, the investment contract has
evolved into a safety net category, designed to capture those transac-
tions that might not otherwise qualify under the Acts, but that have
the potential to expose the public to investment fraud.10
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the mere characterization
of a particular transaction is not conclusive, noting that "[b]ecause se-
curities transactions are economic in character Congress intended the
application of these statutes to turn on the economic realities underly-
ing a transaction, and not on the name appended thereto."" The
courts must therefore examine each scheme before them to determine
whether its economic realities make application of the Securities Acts
appropriate.
The guiding principle for this examination was set forth in the semi-
nal case SEC v. W. Howey Co.'2 In Howey, the Supreme Court de-
fined an investment contract as "a contract, transaction or scheme
whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led
to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third
party. 13 While the Howey test provides a meaningful framework for
courts in their analysis of investment contracts, the test also has raised
significant controversies regarding the satisfaction of its individual
elements.
One of these elements, the "common enterprise" element, has been
the source of great disagreement among the courts.'4 Today, nearly
fifty years after the Howey decision, three distinct interpretations of
what constitutes a common enterprise exist, each of which has been
adopted by certain of the circuit courts of appeals. Some courts have
required "horizontal commonality,"' 5 which focuses on the relation-
ship among multiple investors whose assets are pooled in the invest-
9. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
10. Thus, the investment contract "embodies a flexible rather than a static princi-
ple, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes
devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits."
SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
11. United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975).
12. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
13. Id at 298-99.
14. See infra parts MI and IV.
15. This form of commonality is "horizontal" in that its focus is on the relationship
among investors in equal positions.
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ment fund and who receive profits based on a pro-rata allocation. 16
Other courts have adopted "narrow vertical commonality,"' 7 which
examines the relationship between a promoter and an investor whose
fortunes are mutually dependent.' 8 Still other courts have looked for
"broad vertical commonality," which focuses not on the economic re-
lationship between the investor and promoter, but on the investor's
dependence on the promoter's expertise.' 9
The situation is further complicated by the fact that some circuits
have not adopted any one of the three tests to the exclusion of the
others. Therefore, there are splits within individual circuits, as well as
the long-standing split among the courts of appeals.
This Note will examine the differing approaches to commonality
and will compare the strengths and drawbacks of each approach, eval-
uated in light of the legislative history underlying the Securities Acts
and the purposes behind the Howey decision. Part I briefly analyzes
the legislative history and purposes underlying the Securities Acts and
discusses the Supreme Court's construction of other instruments con-
tained within the 1933 and 1934 Acts' list of securities. Part II in-
troduces a general outline of the Howey test, including a brief
discussion of each of its elements. Part III details the three views of
the common enterprise prong with case illustrations from the various
courts following each view. This part also includes a discussion of the
strengths and shortcomings of each approach. Part IV examines the
confusion still plaguing the courts at mid-decade. Part V argues that
the Supreme Court must resolve this issue so that both promoters and
investors are freed from the current uncertainty as to the applicability
of the Securities Acts. Finally, Part V outlines the proposal for a new,
hybrid test. This Note concludes that a hybrid test, embodying the
analytical strengths of the existing tests while avoiding undue restric-
tion, should be applied by every federal court to ensure that investors
are not left without the protection mandated by Congress.
16. See, e.g., Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216,
222 (6th Cir. 1980) (applying horizontal common enterprise test), aff'd on other
grounds, 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
17. The vertical forms of commonality focus on the relationship between the in-
vestors and promoter in the scheme, who are in unequal positions.
18. See, e.g., Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978) (applying the
narrow vertical commonality test and finding that the success or failure of Bache as a
brokerage house did not correlate with the individual investor's profit or loss and that
therefore the case did not present a common enterprise).
19. See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 1974)
(applying the broad vertical commonality test and holding that the key factor in the
determination of whether a case presents a common enterprise is the effect of the
promoter's expertise on the investor's decision).
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I. THE HISTORY AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT UNDERLYING THE
SECURrrES Acms
To understand the underlying purpose of the Securities Acts, it is
necessary to examine the climate in which they were enacted.20 Un-
fortunately, this task is made difficult by the scarcity of the available
legislative history and the speed with which Congress enacted the
statutes.2'
Prior to 1933, securities regulation was a matter of state law, with so
called blue sky laws'" existing in most states.?3 Despite these regula-
tions, abusive practices abounded in securities transactions.24 Typical
schemes included lack of full and fair disclosure,' blatant fraud in
news accounts,'26 manipulative short sales,27 insider trading,"s and
wash sales.29 These deceptive practices and the lack of effective en-
20. See Susan G. Flanagan, Comment, The Common Enterprise Element of the
Howey Test, 18 Pac. LJ. 1141, 1143 (1987) (discussing the legislative history of the
federal securities laws).
21. See Thomas Roe Frazer II, Comment, Catch-All Investment Contracts: The
Economic Realities Otherwise Require, 14 Cumb. L Rev. 135, 140 (1984); see also
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 694-95 n.7 (1985) (acknowledging
that the legislative history was silent as to whether Congress had contemplated any
particular type of transaction when enacting the Securities Acts).
22. See State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 177 N.W. 937, 938 (Minn. 1920) (de-
fining the state laws as having application to "speculative schemes having no more
basis than so many feet of blue sky"); see also Nathan W. Drage, Comment, Are
Limited Partnership Interests Securities? A Different Conclusion Under the California
Limited Partnership Act, 18 Pac. Li. 125, 129 (1986) (explaining that state securities
laws are referred to as blue sky laws because the purpose of the statutes was to pro-
tect farmers from buying a piece of the blue sky).
23. See generally Susan M. Phillips & J. Richard Zecher, The SEC and the Public
Interest 6 (1981) (identifying the states as the locus of regulation of investment
activity).
24. Joel Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street 16 (1982). Some commenta-
tors, including Professor Seligman, have suggested that the blue sky laws never had a
chance to succeed because of the interstate nature of securities transactions.
25. See id. at 28.
26. See i. at 16-17. For example, over a 10 year period one publicist received
over $280,000 for deliberately planting hyperbolic news stories to raise the prices of
several stocks. Id.
27. See i. at 9. A person selling short is counting on the stock price dropping.
Stock is sold to a purchaser by a person who does not own the stock, but instead
borrows it from a broker to deliver to the purchaser. If the price of the share drops,
the short seller profits by purchasing replacement shares at the lower price to return
to the lending broker. Id. at 9 n.*.
28. See i. at 34. For example, one firm offered stock to preferred insiders at a
cost lower than the price for public trading, guaranteeing the favored investors a
profit. Id.
29. See id. at 17. A wash sale occurs when shares of stock are bought and sold by
the same person or pool of persons to create the illusion of activity in a particular
issue. The trading volume may entice new investors to trade in the security, driving
up the stock prices. Id. at 17 n.*.
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forcement of the state laws were instrumental in artificially inflating
share values during the 1920s.3 °
The belief that these inflated values would continue to rise influ-
enced the behavior of many investors, who borrowed in reliance on
the steady climb and became dangerously leveraged. This continuing
rise, in turn, resulted from "the vested interest in euphoria [that] leads
men and women, individuals and institutions to believe that all will be
better off, that they are meant to be richer and to dismiss as intellectu-
ally deficient what is in conflict with that conviction. ' 31 The market,
however, could not long sustain the feverishly inflationary trend re-
suiting from deceptive practices, and inevitably, it crashed.32 The link
between the fraudulent and unethical practices that were rampant in
the securities industry and the economic catastrophe that resulted is
clear. When the inflationary trend came to its crashing halt, half of
the new securities issued in the 1920s proved to be utterly without
value.33 The infamous stock market crash of 1929 saw the collapse of
the entire securities market and precipitated the country's decline into
an unprecedented economic crisis.
The Stock Exchange Hearings34 of 1932 grew out of a Congres-
sional conviction that the stock market crash was a cause rather than
an effect of the Depression. 35 The purpose of the hearings was to ex-
amine the forces behind the plummet in stock values and to prevent
another crash.36 The Banking Committee exposed many of the abuses
within the securities industry, leading to a recognition of the need for
a national system of regulatory reform.37 The enactment of the Secur-
ities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was the end
result of this pendulum swing in favor of reform.
The Senate outlined the purposes of the Securities Act of 1933 as
follows:
30. See, e.g., Robert J. MacKay & Joseph D. Reid, Jr., On Understanding the Birth
and Evolution of the Securities and Exchange Commission: Where Are We in the The-
ory of Regulation?, in Regulatory Change in an Atmosphere of Crisis 101, 103 (Gary
M. Walton ed., 1979) (noting that where market failure leads to a scant and unskillful
valuation of securities by investors, everyone gains from the regulatory correction of
market failures due to frauds).
31. Eugene N. White, When the Ticker Ran Late: The Stock Market Boom and
Crash of 1929, in Crashes and Panics 143, 144 (Eugene N. White ed., 1990) (citation
omitted).
32. Id. at 145 (discussing the "inevitability of the bubble's collapse").
33. Seligman, supra note 24, at 1-2.
34. Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings Before the Senate Banking Comm., 72d &
73d Congs., 1st & 2d Sess. (1932-34).
35. William J. Carney, Defining a Security: The Addition of a Market-Oriented
Contextual Approach to Investment Contract Analysis, 33 Emory L.J. 311, 348 (1984).
36. Seligman, supra note 24, at 2.
37. See J.M. Balkin, Ideology and Counter-Ideology from Lochner to Garcia, 54
U.M.K.C. L. Rev. 175, 188 (1986) (defining regulatory reform ideology as a prefer-
ence for uniform national regulation of the economy).
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The purpose of this bill is to protect the investing public and honest
business. The basic policy is that of informing the investor of the
facts concerning securities to be offered for sale in interstate and
foreign commerce and providing protection against fraud and
misrepresentation.
The aim is to prevent further exploitation of the public by the sale
of unsound, fraudulent, and worthless securities through misrepre-
sentation; to place adequate and true information before the inves-
tor; to protect honest enterprise, seeking capital by honest
presentation, against the competition afforded by dishonest securi-
ties offered to the public through crooked promotion; to restore the
confidence of the prospective investor in his ability to select sound
securities; to bring into productive channels of industry and devel-
opment capital which has grown timid to the point of hoarding; and
to aid in providing employment and restoring buying and consum-
ing power.as
Thus, the legislators were influenced by both ethical and prudential
considerations. The Acts' drafters believed that imposition of a dis-
closure obligation would lead to an improved investment climate and
ultimately to economic recovery.
The 1933 Act requires that all new issues that do not qualify for a
listed exemption 9 be registered prior to being offered or sold to in-
vestors40 In addition, all sales must be accompanied by a prospec-
tus.41 The federal regulation of securities thus operates as a disclosure
system rather than a system of merit regulation. The investor is guar-
anteed the information in the registration statement and the prospec-
tus. Armed with this information, she is then free to make her own
assessment of the investment quality of the offered transaction. Fi-
nally, the 1933 Act ensures that the material information received by
the prospective investor is fair and accurate by prohibiting misrepre-
sentations in connection with the offer and sale of any security.42
The 1934 Act carries the disclosure standards beyond registration
and initial sale to secondary trading.43 The Act imposes periodic re-
porting requirements that guarantee prospective purchasers updated
information about the securities on offer. The 1934 Act outlaws the
use of any "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance""' in con-
nection with the sale of a security. The prohibition on fraud applies
38. S. Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933). See generally Manuel F. Cohen,
Federal Legislation Affecting the Public Offering of Securities, 28 Geo. Wash. L Rev.
119, 156 (1959) (indicating that the intent of Congress in enacting the 1933 Act was to
impose a fiduciary standard on persons who solicit and take public money for invest-
ment purposes).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1988).
40. Id. § 77e (1988).
41. Id. § 77e, 77j (1988).
42. Id § 77q (1988).
43. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78c (1988).
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whether the security was subject to registration or qualified for an ex-
emption.45 The 1934 Act established the Securities and Exchange
Commission as the body responsible for enforcing both Acts. 6 The
Acts constitute interrelated components of a federal regulatory sys-
tem of full and fair disclosure.47
The Supreme Court has addressed the construction and purposes of
the Securities Acts with respect to some of the instruments that ap-
pear on the Acts' laundry lists. s In Landreth Timber Co. v. Lan-
dreth,49 the Court addressed the question of whether an instrument
labelled "stock" was a security. Rejecting the application of the eco-
nomic reality test,50 the Court held that there was no need to look
beyond the characteristics of the instrument to determine whether the
Acts applied.51 The Court ruled that the shares in question, which
were labelled "stock" and which demonstrated the attributes typically
associated with stock, were securities. The Court indicated that its de-
cision was compelled by the remedial purposes underlying the Securi-
ties Acts:
Reading the securities laws to apply to the sale of stock at issue here
comports with Congress' remedial purpose in enacting the legisla-
tion to protect investors by "compelling full and fair disclosure rela-
tive to the issuance of the many types of instruments that in our
commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security."' 2
While recognizing that Congress had not intended to create a compre-
hensive federal remedy for all fraud, the Court nonetheless held that
it would improperly narrow Congress' broad definition of "security"
to hold that the traditional stock at issue fell outside the Acts'
coverage.53
In Reves v. Ernst & Young,54 the Supreme Court took a slightly dif-
ferent approach. Reves involved the question of whether a demand
note properly fell within the definition of a security under the 1933
and 1934 Acts. The Court stated that "the phrase 'any note' should
not be interpreted to mean literally 'any note,' but must be under-
stood against the backdrop of what Congress was attempting to ac-
complish in enacting the Securities Acts."'5 5 The Court identified
45. Id
46. IL § 78d (1988).
47. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 727-28 (1975).
48. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
49. 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
50. For a brief discussion of the economic reality test, see supra note 11 and ac-
companying text.
51. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 690.
52. IL at 687 (quoting SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946) (citation
omitted)).
53. Id at 687-88.
54. 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
55. Id at 63.
2142 [Vol. 63
COMMON ENTERPRISE
"[t]he fundamental purpose undergirding the Securities Acts"56 as the
elimination of abuses in the previously unregulated securities mar-
ket.57 Further, the Court found that in enacting a definition of secur-
ity sufficiently broad to encompass virtually any instrument that might
be sold as an investment, Congress deliberately "painted with a broad
brush."' Despite this sweeping view of the legislative intent and the
scope of the statutory language, the Court declined to find that every
note is automatically a security. Instead, the Court established a pre-
sumption that every note is a security, but recognized that "this pre-
sumption cannot be irrebuttable. '59 The Court adopted a "family
resemblance" test under which a note is a security unless it bears a
family resemblance to a judicially crafted list of instruments that are
not securities.60 This list of "notes" that are not securities can be ex-
panded as the need arises.6
The Reves case may represent a retreat from the all-embracing view
of the scope of the term "security." The Reves Court, however, was
careful to emphasize that its holding applied only to notes, which it
expressly distinguished both from stocka and from investment con-
tracts.63 The Landreth Court was similarly anxious to distinguish the
catch-all categories, including the investment contract, from terms
with a settled meaning, such as stock.64
In both cases, the Court balanced the need to give full effect to the
remedial purposes of the securities laws against the need to supply a
limiting principle to prevent the Acts from becoming a general pro-
scription against fraud in any context. Where the listed instrument
has a familiar, readily identifiable meaning, the Court appears to have
found that the "goal of clarity" predominated over "the goal of avoid-
ing manipulation by the clever and the dishonest."' 5 In the case of a
more flexible instrument, such as an investment contract, these priori-
ties may be reversed. Indeed, if Reves signals a trend towards a more
restrictive definition of security with respect to certain instruments,
the courts may have to construe the investment contract even more
broadly to ensure that the policies of investor protection underlying
the Securities Acts are met.
Both Landreth and Reves included broad statements about the re-
medial purposes underlying the federal securities laws. The Acts were
designed to remedy the evils that, in Congress' view, resulted from
56. Id at 60.
57. Id.
58. Id
59. Id. at 65.
60. Id
61. Id at 66.
62. Id at 62.
63. Id at 64.
64. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 (1985).
65. Reves, 494 U.S. at 63 n.2.
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underenforcement of the patchwork quilt of state regulatory schemes.
Congress intended the Securities Acts to accomplish a number of
objectives: to draw out timid capital,66 to impose an ethic of full and
fair disclosure, and to armor the country against another crash by
granting investors the means to make informed investment deci-
sions.67 Any rule of law or interpretation under the Acts, including
the Howey test and its elements, must be measured against these re-
medial purposes.
Hl. THE HowEY TEST AND TBE FOUNDATIONS OF INVESTMENT
CoNTRACT ANALYSIS
Prior to the decision in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,68 no authoritative
definition of the term "investment contract" existed under the Securi-
ties Acts. The term, however, was common in state blue sky laws that
existed prior to the adoption of the federal statutes. Although the
term also lacked an express definition under state law, it had been
broadly construed by state courts to afford the investing public a full
measure of protection. 69 In interpreting the term "investment con-
tract," courts generally disregarded form for substance and placed em-
phasis upon economic reality.70 The investment contract acted as a
catch-all instrument, capable of capturing capital-seeking transactions
that fell outside the more orthodox categories of securities, such as
stocks or bonds. An investment contract under state law thus came to
mean a contract or scheme for the "placing of capital or laying out of
money in a way intended to secure income or profit from its
employment."71
The federal legislators were no doubt familiar with the term and
were aware of its evolution in blue sky jurisprudence as a broad,
catch-all instrument. Thus, the Acts' drafters approved and adopted
the expansive construction of the investment contract. 72
Moreover, the Securities Acts contain more than one catch-all pro-
vision, designed to close any loopholes inherent in a specific definition
66. See S. Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933) (listing as one of the motiva-
tions behind the enactment a desire "to bring into productive channels of industry and
development capital which has grown timid to the point of hoarding").
67. See, e.g., Reves, 494 U.S. at 60 ("The fundamental purpose undergirding the
Securities Acts is 'to eliminate serious abuses in a largely unregulated securities mar-
ket.'" (quoting United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975))).
68. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
69. See, e.g., State v. Evans, 191 N.W. 425, 427 (Minn. 1922); State v. Gopher Tire
& Rubber Co., 177 N.W. 937, 938 (Minn. 1920); Stevens v. Liberty Packaging Corp.,
161 A. 193, 195 (N.J. 1932).
70. See SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946) (citing State v. Gopher
Tire, 177 N.W. 937 (Minn. 1920)).
71. Gopher Tire, 177 N.W. at 938.
72. See, e.g., Reves, 494 U.S. at 77 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("In construing any
terms whose meanings are less than plain, we depend on the common understanding
of those terms at the time of the statute's creation.").
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of a security. The Acts refer to such flexible instruments as a "certifi-
cate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement"' and
"any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security',' 4 as well
as including the term "investment contract." To avoid redundancy,
investment contracts should constitute those transactions that are not
evidenced by a certificate or share and that do not fit the paradigm of
that which would be "commonly known as a security." The inclusion
of the term extends the reach of the Acts beyond those schemes that
are directly analogous to familiar documents traded for speculation or
investment. Responsibility for the further development of the term
from this basis was left to the courts.
In 1943, in SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,7 5 the Supreme Court
confirmed that the investment contract would serve as an instrument
enabling the courts to reach unusual or novel transactions that would
not otherwise fall within the ambit of the Securities Acts.7 6 The Court
stated:
[T]he reach of the Act does not stop with the obvious and common-
place. Novel, uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they appear
to be, are also reached if it be proved as matter of fact that they
were widely offered or dealt in under terms or courses of dealing
which established their character in commerce as "investment
contracts."'77
In 1946, the Supreme Court took up the task of setting workable
limits on the investment contract while remaining true to the remedial
purposes of the Securities Acts. In SEC v. W. Howey Co. ,7 the SEC
brought an enforcement action against a Florida corporation that
owned a large citrus grove. The corporation had offered purchasers
land sales contracts for small parcels of the grove along with a service
contract for harvesting and marketing the fruit.79 The purchasers'
tracts were jointly cultivated, and the company sold the produce, dis-
tributing the profits to the purchasers based on the acreage owned by
each. 0 Owing to economies of scale involved, the individual pur-
chaser could not cultivate his or her small parcel profitably.8' The
purchasers had no legal right of entry on the land to market the crop
and had no right to specific fruit.'
Based on these facts, the Court held that the transactions in effect
involved the offer of an opportunity to contribute money and share in
73. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988).
74. Id
75. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
76. Id at 351.
77. Id
78. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
79. Id at 295.
80. Id at 296.
81. Id at 295.
82. Id at 296.
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the profits of a large citrus fruit enterprise, managed by the defendant
corporation.83 The land sales contracts served as a convenient mea-
sure of the investors' respective shares of the profits, but the resulting
transfers of rights in land were viewed by the Court as purely inciden-
tal to the profit-seeking venture:
The investors provide the capital and share in the earnings and prof-
its; the promoters manage, control and operate the enterprise. It
follows that the arrangements whereby the investors' interests are
made manifest involve investment contracts, regardless of the legal
terminology in which such contracts are clothed.84
The Howey Court elaborated on the term "investment contract,"
stating: "An investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act
means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his
money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from
the efforts of the promoter or a third party .... ,"8- From this lan-
guage, the four elements that comprise the Howey test emerged: (1)
the investment of money; (2) in a common enterprise; (3) with the
expectation of profits; (4) to come solely from the efforts of others.
The Howey Court emphasized that its aim was to create a dynamic,
flexible test that would give effect to the Congressional intent to pro-
tect the public from all deceptive schemes.86 The enduring validity of
the test is evidenced by the fact that, forty-nine years later, courts still
apply the Howey test as the key to investment contract analysis.87
An examination of the post-Howey cases that have developed or
refined the particular elements of the investment contract test 8 il-
luminates a clear trend towards a less restrictive, more inclusive con-
struction.89 This is consistent with the Howey Court's objective of
83. 1L at 301. This holding represented an even further departure from the famil-
iar paradigm of a security than had the Joiner case, which involved the assignment of
leaseholds on which oil wells were to be drilled. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,
320 U.S. 344, 345 (1943).
84. Howey, 328 U.S. at 300.
85. Id. at 298-99.
86. I The Court stated that the test "embodies a flexible rather than a static
principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable
schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of
profits." Id. at 299.
87. For example, Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1994),
recently continued the application of the Howey test as the authoritative standard in
the investment contract analysis.
88. See Gene H. Williams, Note, The Continued Demise of the Howey Test: The
Supreme Court Adopts the "Family Resemblance Test" For Identifying Notes as Securi-
ties, 20 Stetson L. Rev. 613, 619-22 (analyzing the individual elements of the Howey
test). This discussion sets aside, for the moment, the common enterprise element,
which will be expanded in part III.
89. Of course, to look at any one element of the test in isolation is somewhat
artificial. Courts applying the test are looking at all the factors as interrelated compo-
nents that collectively define a particular transaction as an investment contract.
2146 [Vol. 63
COMMON ENTERPRISE
creating a dynamic, flexible test and with the Congressional intent em-
bodied in the Securities Acts.
A. The Investment of Money
The requirement of an investment of money is designed to capture
only those investors who have undertaken some degree of economic
risk.90 Consistent with the remedial purposes of the Securities Acts,
courts have held that consideration other than cash satisfies this ele-
ment.91 Interests in partnerships and stock in corporations, for exam-
ple, are generally freely transferable for services or property.92 Thus,
any plaintiff who had made the necessary investment of capital and
undertaken the consequent risk of loss would not be eliminated on
this first prong of the Howey test.
While this element of the Howey test seems simple, even self-evi-
dent, it has occasionally been the subject of dispute. For example, in
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel,93 the Supreme
Court found that employee interests in a noncontributory, compulsory
pension plan did not qualify as investment contracts subject to the
Securities Acts. The Court based this conclusion on the fact that the
employees had not been required to make a sufficient investment of
money. The employees merely contributed labor and services, while
the employer made the actual monetary contributions.9 Thus, the
plaintiffs in Daniel had not risked any economic loss and did not re-
quire the protections of the Securities Acts.
B. The Common Enterprise
The "common enterprise" element is the issue at the heart of this
Note and is only briefly addressed here to give a sense of its relation
90. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 67 (1990) (discussing the relationship
between risk and the necessity of application of the Securities 
Acts).
91. See, eg., Joseph C. Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the
Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24 Okla. L. Rev. 135, 161 (1971) (noting that
"the consideration does not have to take the form of cash received").
92. For example, under § 6.21(b) of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act
(1985), consideration may consist of "any tangible or intangible property ... including
cash, promissory notes, services performed, contracts for services to be performed, or
other securities of the corporation." Revised Model Business Corp. Act § 621(b)
(1985).
93. 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
94. Id at 560-61; accord Black v. Payne, 591 F.2d 83, 87 (9th Cir.) (holding that
participation in Public Employees Retirement System did not constitute an invest-
ment contract), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867 (1979); see also Coward v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 686 F.2d 1230, 1236-37 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that there was no real
economic risk to retirement plan's employee participants and thus the plan did not
constitute a security), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1070 (1983); Childers v. Northwest Air-
lines, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 1357, 1362-62 (D. Mln. 1988) (finding that employee stock
option plans were not securities under state or federal law).
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to the Howey test as a whole.' While the Howey Court did not make
explicit its reasons for including this element, canons of construction
compel the conclusion that it was neither inadvertent nor superflu-
ous." Therefore, this element must meaningfully limit qualifying in-
struments to those that are properly subject to the Acts. Requiring
that an enterprise be "common" seems designed to exclude one-on-
one contracts, bargained for at arm's length.97 The common enter-
prise requirement posits some ongoing relationship or nexus among
individuals with respect to a transaction. Where this nexus occurs, the
ordinary rule of "caveat emptor" must give way to a policy of full
disclosure.98 Courts have disagreed strenuously about the type of
common interest and degree of commonality that any investment
must exhibit.99
C. The Expectation of Profits
The expectation of profits element of the investment contract test
concerns the purpose for which capital is put forth by the investor.'00
If the investor's purpose is to generate a return, regardless of the form
in which such return is clothed, the policies of the Securities Acts
come into play. 1 1
The courts have interpreted "profits" expansively and have refused
to confine the term to any one form of return. Instead, the courts
have preferred to define this requirement in broad terms, as capital
appreciation or "a participation in earnings resulting from the use of
investors' funds."' The courts are generally in agreement that prof-
its can include non-monetary returns.10 3 Conversely, even a monetary
return may fail to satisfy this element on occasion. Interest proceeds,
95. For a more complete analysis of the common enterprise element, see infra part
III.
96. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Harlan v. Bacon, 21 F.3d 209, 212 (8th Cir. 1994)
("[I]t is a cardinal and long-revered canon of statutory construction that Congress is
not to be presumed to have done a vain thing, namely, using superfluous language.").
97. See generally James D. Gordon flI, Common Enterprise and Multiple Inves-
tors: A Contractual Theory for Defining Investment Contracts and Notes, 1988 Colum.
Bus. L. Rev. 635 (1988) (arguing that the Securities Acts should not extend to unique,
individually-negotiated contracts between two parties).
98. See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)
(citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)).
99. This disagreement will be explored at length in infra parts III and IV.
100. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 66 (1990) ("[We examine the trans-
action to assess the motivations that would prompt a reasonable seller and buyer to
enter into it.").
101. Id ("If the seller's purpose is to raise money for the general use of a business
enterprise or to finance substantial investments and the buyer is interested primarily
in the profit [the instrument] is expected to generate, the instrument is likely to be a
'security.' ").
102. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975).
103. See, e.g., Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 361 P.2d 906, 908-09 (Cal.
1961) (holding that membership interests in a country club were sufficient manifesta-
tions of profit to bring action within the state's securities laws); see also Thaddeus A.
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for example, are monetary but are generally not considered to satisfy
this element.'x 4
The Supreme Court addressed this requirement in United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman.105 In that case, the Court looked at
shares of stock in a low-income housing cooperative to see if the
shares qualified as investment contracts under the Securities Acts.'06
The Court held that the shares in question did not meet the expecta-
tion of profits requirement because the purchasers' incentive in enter-
ing the transaction was to obtain affordable housing and not to earn a
return.107 The Court thus examined the motivation of the investors
rather than the form in which the return was received.
D. Profits To Come Solely from the Efforts of Others
The fourth element of the Howey test addresses the degree of con-
trol exercised over the investment by the investor. If the investor is
intimately involved in the running of the business, then he or she can
affect the return received and is likely to have access to information
regarding the investment's condition. This type of involved investor
has no need for the enhanced disclosure required by the Acts. If, on
the other hand, the investor is an outsider whose profits depend on
exertions by third parties, the disclosure policies of the Acts are di-
rectly implicated.
The Howey test therefore contemplates that the exertions relevant
to the investment will come not from the investor' but from the pro-
moter or a third party."° In accordance with the courts' generally
expansive approach, later cases have softened this requirement by in-
terpreting "solely" to mean "largely" or "principally.""' The courts'
Mazurek, Jr., Securities: Defining Investment Contracts-Alternatives for Arizona,
1984 Ariz. St. L.J. 489, 506 (1984) (adopting a similarly expansive view of profits).
104. See, e.g., Developer's Mortgage Co. v. Transohio Say. Bank, 706 F. Supp. 570,
588 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (holding that because the agreements in question had fixed
returns and contingencies similar to those in ordinary commercial loan transactions,
there was no reasonable expectation of profits).
105. 421 U.S. 837 (1975). The investment contract analysis was only one aspect of
the Forman case, which also defined the essential attributes of stock. See Landreth
Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686-87 (1985).
106. Forman, 421 U.S. at 840-45.
107. Id at 856-57. The Court further noted that the interests' characterization as
stock was not dispositive of the issue. The shares in question lacked all of the usual
attributes of stock and were therefore not securities. Id. at 848-51.
108. See Mace Neufeld Prods., Inc. v. Orion Pictures Corp., 860 F.2d 944 (9th Cir.
1988) (holding that plaintiff's involvement in producing television series precluded a
finding of an investment contract); Faircloth v. Jackie Fine Arts, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 837,
843-45 (D.S.C. 1988) (holding that the transaction at issue did not involve a security
because the plaintiff could have marketed the master art reproductions himself but
elected not to do so).
109. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852.
110. See, e.g., Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1455 (9th Cir. 1989) (indicating
that the proper standard is whether "undeniably significant" efforts are contributed
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refusal to be restricted to the literal term has enabled them to reach
such transactions as founder-member arrangements,"' licensing
agreements,1 2 and pyramid sale schemes. 113
SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises"' presents an example of an
otherwise meritorious claim that would be defeated by an overly strict
interpretation of Howey's final requirement. In Turner, a corporation
with the unlikely name of Dare to Be Great, Inc. marketed self-im-
provement courses. The purchasers of the courses received two bene-
fits: the privilege to attend seminars and, more significantly, the right
to sell the courses to others and receive a commission.1 5 The district
court preliminarily enjoined the sale of these courses as unregistered,
non-exempt securities under the 1933 Act.116 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit acknowledged that the investor was required to exert some
effort on his own behalf to realize a return." 7 The court, however,
reasoned that a literal interpretation of the final element of the
Howey test would permit a dealer to evade the application of the Se-
curities Acts simply by requiring the buyer "to contribute a modicum
of effort." 1 8 To avoid such an unrealistic consequence in light of the
remedial purpose of the securities laws, the Turner court held that the
test is whether the significant efforts of the enterprise are contributed
by people other than the investor." 9 The Turner court eschewed a
literal interpretation of the fourth prong of the Howey test, but left to
a later court the determination of just which efforts must be contrib-
uted by a third party for the enterprise to qualify as a security.
by parties other than the investor); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476,482(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973) (noting that a strictly literal interpretation
would contravene the remedial purposes of the Securities Acts).
111. See State v. Hawaii Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485 P.2d 105, 108-09 (Haw. 1971).
112. See SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prods., 687 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1086 (1982).
113. See SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 484-85 (5th Cir. 1974);
SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476,482 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 414 U.S. 821(1973). A pyramid sale arrangement generally involves a distribution system whereby
each middleman receives commissions through recruitment of others who sell prod-
ucts and services, who in turn recruit other individuals, creating a management chain
that resembles a pyramid. See generally Joseph P. Whitford, Note, Pyramid Scheme
Regulation: The Evolution of Investment Contracts as Security Under the Federal Se-
curities Law, 25 Syracuse L. Rev. 690 (1974) (discussing application of Securities Acts
to pyramid schemes).
114. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
115. Id. at 478-79.
116. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 348 F. Supp. 766, 776-77 (D. Or. 1972).
117. Turner, 474 F.2d at 482.
118. Turner, 474 F.2d at 482.
119. Accord SEC v. Goldfield Deep Mines Co., 758 F.2d 459, 464 (9th Cir. 1985);
SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 483 (5th Cir. 1974); see also Bailey v.
J.W.K. Properties, 904 F.2d 918, 923-24 (4th Cir. 1990) (examining the ability of each
individual investor to exercise ultimate control over the common enterprise).
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In Hocking v. Dubois," the Ninth Circuit decided that the applica-
ble standard is whether "'the efforts made by those other than the
investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential manage-
rial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise.' "121
Several other circuits" have adopted the "undeniably significant"
test that the Supreme Court noted, but did not apply, in the Forman
case.
12 3
The courts have taken a consistently expansive approach in clarify-
ing the particular elements of the Howey test. This expansive view
corresponds with both the Howey decision's avowed intent to create a
dynamic and flexible test and the policies underlying the Securities
Acts. Moreover, the development of this expansive jurisprudence
further supports an unrestricted approach. Any case construing the
investment contract test must now take account not only of the stat-
utes and the Howey decision, but of the inclusive trend that runs
throughout the post-Howey investment contract analysis as well.
The courts' construction of the various elements of the Howey test
adds up to a portrait of the investor whom the courts were anxious to
protect under the rubric of the investment contract. The investor has
undertaken some degree of economic risk." She is involved with at
least one other individual in a transaction in which their interests may
overlap or even conflict.' z The investor's motivation in making her
investment is based upon the promise of a return. 6 Finally, the in-
vestor of whom the courts are solicitous does not meaningfully partici-
pate in the running of the company in which she has invested and
therefore has minimal or no control over the investment's perform-
120. 885 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1989).
121. Id. at 1455 (quoting Turner, 474 F.2d at 482).
122. See, eg., Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 103 (3d Cir.) (advocating a
non-literal reading of the term "solely"), cerL denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); Williamson
v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404,418 (5th Cir.) ("[W]e adopt a more realistic test, whether the
efforts made by those other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones,
those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enter-
prise." (quotation omitted)), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); Odom v. Slavik, 703
F.2d 212, 215 (6th Cir. 1983) (stating that courts have noted that "solely" is not to be
read strictly). The Williamson court cited three factors to be applied in determining if
the test has been met with respect to a partnership, including: (1) an agreement of the
parties that leaves so little power in the hands of the partner or venturer that the
agreement in fact distributes power as would a limited partnership; (2) the partner or
venturer is so inexperienced and unknowledgable in business affairs that he is incapa-
ble of intelligently exercising his partnership or venture powers; or (3) the partner or
venturer is so dependent upon some unique entrepreneurial or managerial ability of
the promoter or manager that he cannot replace the manager of the enterprise or
otherwise exercise meaningful partnership or venture powers. Williamson, 645 F.2d at
418-423.
123. United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 n.16 (1975).
124. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
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ance. 127 The courts have concluded that such an investor has a special
need for the full and fair disclosure mandated by the Securities Acts
to make an informed investment decision.
III. DEFINING A COMMON ENTERPRISE: THREE COMPETING
Vmws
The common enterprise element of the investment contract test im-
plicates the same policy concerns addressed by courts that have inter-
preted the other elements of the Howey test. Because the Securities
Acts are not simply general proscriptions against fraud,128 the test
must define those transactions whose characteristics are such that the
application of the Securities Acts' protections is apposite. The test
also must ensure that the investor for whose protection the Securities
Acts were designed receives that protection.
The Howey Court required that to qualify as a security a particular
transaction must constitute a "common enterprise. ' 129 Clearly, this
prong of the test contemplates that some relationship between indi-
viduals will exist with respect to a particular transaction. The case is
silent, however, as to exactly what that relationship should be, how
many individuals must be involved, or what role each individual
should play if application of the Securities Acts is to be justified. Con-
sequently, the courts have developed three different approaches to
commonality: horizontal, strict vertical, and broad vertical, each
based on courts' differing conclusions regarding the preconditions
necessary to trigger application of the Securities Acts.
A. Horizontal Commonality
Horizontal commonality is the most restrictive of the three ap-
proaches to common enterprise and is based on some courts' interpre-
tation of the facts of Howey itself.130 The horizontal approach
examines the relationship among investors in a given transaction.
Specifically, horizontal commonality requires a pooling of investors'
127. See supra notes 108-19 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990) (holding that "Con-
gress did not... 'intend to provide a broad federal remedy for all fraud'" in the
Securities Acts) (quoting Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982)); Landreth
Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 687-88 (1985) (recognizing that Congress did
not intend the Acts to provide a comprehensive federal remedy for all fraud).
129. SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
130. Id at 294-97. In Howey, fruit from orange trees was collectively marketed and
sold. Id at 299. The proceeds were distributed to the investors in proportion to the
number of citrus trees owned by each investor rather than by the yield of each indi-
vidual tree. Id at 296. This has been interpreted as leading to a requirement of pool-
ing or a pro-rata distribution of profits. See, e.g., Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 222 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that the transaction at
issue did not involve pooling and therefore failed to meet the common enterprise
test), aff'd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
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contributions13' and distribution of profits and losses on a pro-rata
basis3 2 among investors. 33 Courts adopting this view believe that
only a transaction satisfying these conditions presents a common en-
terprise. Thus, the fortunes of each investor must be tied both to the
success of the overall venture and to the fortunes of her fellow inves-
tors.' 4 By its terms, this test excludes transactions involving only one
investor.' 35 Although technically the horizontal test requires the in-
volvement of only three individuals (two investors and a promoter),
the reality is that a system of pro-rata allocation is not very cost-effec-
tive unless several investors are involved. The horizontal test is there-
fore likely to embrace within its definition only those schemes in
which numerous investors contribute to a fund and share proportion-
ally in the returns.
Multiplicity of investors alone, however, is not enough. The com-
monality of interest among investors depends partly upon what the
court determines to be the relevant investment unit. In Milnarik v. M-
S Commodities, Inc.,36 for example, a group of family members
opened a discretionary commodity trading account.137 The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit scoffed at the idea that "every con-
ceivable arrangement that would fit a dictionary definition of an in-
vestment contract was intended to be included within the statutory
definition of a security."'38 The court concluded that the defendant
131. See John F.X. Peloso & Charles G. LaBella, Determining If Discretionary Cus-
tomer Accounts Are Securities, 9 Sec. Reg. LJ. 307, 317-18 (1982) (defining "investor
funds" to include the assets contributed by multiple investors to a particular scheme).
132. See Black's Law Dictionary 848 (abr. 6th ed. 1991) (defining "pro rata" as
"[p]roportionately; according to a certain rate, percentage or proportion .... For
example, if a corporation has ten shareholders each of whom owns 10% of the stock,
a pro-rata dividend distribution of $1,000 would mean that each shareholder would
receive $100.").
133. See Curran, 622 F.2d at 222-23.
134. Id. at 224; see also Deckebach v. La Vida Charters, Inc., 867 F.2d 278, 283 (6th
Cir. 1989) (holding that plaintiffs failed to prove a common enterprise because they
failed to demonstrate a pooling of venture capital); Arnold v. Bache & Co., 377 F.
Supp. 61, 64 (M.D. Pa. 1973) (finding that a discretionary commodity account was not
a security due to lack of common enterprise); Stuckey v. duPont Glore Forgan Inc., 59
F.RD. 129, 131 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (holding that discretionary commodities futures
trading account failed to demonstrate horizontal commonality).
135. Curran, 622 F.2d at 222-23.
136. 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
137. Id. at 274; see also Nilnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 1149, 1149
(N.D. Iil. 1970). For factually similar cases, see Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459
(9th Cir. 1978), and SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir.
1974). See also Peloso & LaBella, supra note 131, at 308. A discretionary commodity
trading account is one in which the investor gives the broker power of attorney to
make all trading decisions. The broker is empowered to manage the account for the
benefit of the investor and does not have to consult or obtain permission to trade the
accounts. Id. at 308 n.1. This Note refers to this type of investment on a recurring
basis to illustrate the distinct results obtained by applying the different commonality
tests to the same or similar factual constructs.
138. Milnarik, 457 F.2d at 275-76.
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broker was merely a common agent for all of his customers, including
the plaintiffs.139 Common enterprise was lacking because these dispa-
rate customers made no unified investment decisions. 40  The
Milnarik court refused to credit the conversion of the agency relation-
ship into a statutory security. 14 1 The court's analysis was premised on
its unarticulated assumption that the Howey test required a finding of
a common enterprise among all the broker's customers. Milnarik did
not address the commonality of interest within the family unit which
held the account. While the larger investment unit failed the horizon-
tal commonality test, this smaller group may well have participated in
a common enterprise, even under the court's restrictive view.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals maintained its allegiance to
the horizontal test in Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc. 4 ' In Hirk,
the investor opened a discretionary futures trading account and exe-
cuted a power of attorney permitting the broker to trade his ac-
count.143 After suffering substantial losses, the investor sued claiming
that he had been fraudulently induced to enter the trading agreement
in violation of the 1933 Act.' 44 Hirk identified a "tripartite frame-
work"' 45 of principles governing the construction of the term "invest-
ment contract": the remedial nature of the securities laws, a
legislative mandate for a liberal and flexible interpretation, and an
emphasis on economic reality.146 None of these broad principles,
however, was significant enough to divert the Seventh Circuit from its
adherence to a strict pooling requirement. Because the investor in
Hirk was unable to demonstrate that his funds were pooled with those
of other investors, the court found that a common enterprise was lack-
ing and the Securities Act did not apply. 47 The court quoted with
approval the Milnarik court's rejection of the all-inclusive, "dictionary
definition" approach.'4 8 Beyond its reluctance to overrule Milnarik,
however, the court provided no affirmative support for the pooling
limitation.
The strengths of the horizontal commonality test include its ease of
application and the meaningful limits it sets on the types of enterprises
that qualify as securities. The test establishes an easily determinable
dividing line and does not require a great deal of difficult umpiring by
the fact-finder. For example, it is clearly easier to assess whether
139. Idt at 278 (noting that plaintiffs were merely the principals of an agent).
140. Idt at 279.
141. Id
142. 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977).
143. I at 98.
144. Id
145. It at 100.
146. Id
147. It at 102.




there has been pooling or a pro-rata sharing of assets than whether
the success of the investment has been inextricably intertwined with
the promoter's efficiency-a judgment called for under the broad ver-
tical commonality test.'49 Under the horizontal test, an investor or
promoter need not wait for judicial resolution to know whether the
prerequisites for the application of the Securities Acts have been met.
If there are multiple investors and pooling or pro-rata allocation has
occurred, then the issue meets the common enterprise requirement.
Thus, the registration, disclosure, and other obligations under the Acts
are triggered.
Furthermore, the horizontal test is likely to restrict qualifying in-
vestment contracts to transactions that closely resemble the conven-
tional definition of a security. Qualifying investments will involve
multiple contributors sharing profits and losses on a proportional ba-
sis, much as shareholders in a corporation do. The Securities Acts,
however, include within their intendment "any interest or instrument
commonly known as a security" as a separate category of securities. 150
To the extent that application of the horizontal test causes the defini-
tion of an investment contract to overlap with this additional category,
this approach renders one of the listed instruments superfluous.
Courts relying on this test have pointed to the fact that the Howey
case itself involved multiple investors participating in a single invest-
ment enterprise.151 Neither the broad vertical nor the narrow vertical
approaches have received even implicit Supreme Court endorsement.
Finally, the provisions of the Securities Acts were not intended to
reach fraud in general, and the horizontal test is capable of identifying
transactions to which the Acts should apply. As Professor Ronald
Coffey noted:
The special prohibitions against misstatements and material omis-
sions, together with specific procedures and remedies, constitute a
general liberalization of common law fraud relief and are obviously
meant to apply only when there are special policy justifications for
invoking their protection.
Combining the preceding conclusions, the following proposition
may be legitimately derived from an examination of statutory con-
struction: A "security" is a transaction whose characteristics distin-
149. See infra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
150. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1988).
151. See, e.g., Hirk, 561 F.2d at 101 ("It is apparent then that this Court's decision
in [an earlier case] was based on the assumption that a sharing or pooling of funds is
required by Howey."); see also SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293,296 (1946) ("All
the produce is pooled by the respondent companies.... .") This interpretation, how-
ever, merits closer analysis. The facts of Howey indicate that the payments of the
individual investors were for the purchase or servicing of individual tracts. The prof-
its were based on the estimated yield of each individual tract. kL at 295-96. There is
an argument to be made that this is not really a pooling of assets with a pro-rata
distribution of profits but rather a convenient system of accounting which avoided the
need to count each orange in calculating the investor's return.
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guish it from the generality of transactions so as to create a need for
the special fraud procedures, protections and remedies provided by
the securities laws. This proposition may be rephrased in the form
of a "master question" regarding the nature of a security: What
characteristics or features of a transaction necessitate its being sub-ject to the rather specialized anti-fraud protection afforded by the
securities laws? 152
The horizontal test answers this "master question" by requiring cer-
tain characteristics of qualifying transactions. A transaction in which
there are multiple investors whose funds are pooled, and who receive
a pro-rata distribution of profits or allocation of losses, is one to which
the securities laws should apply under the horizontal test. The test
seems to assume that where there is a single investor or where the
investor's contribution is separate and distinguishable, the investor
can negotiate for the relevant information and does not require the
protection of the Securities Acts.
The horizontal test is unduly restrictive, however, when it limits
commonality to transactions that involve more than one investor.153
Regardless of the fraud perpetrated or the investor's lack of expertise
and dependence on the promoter, the common enterprise element
will not be present unless multiple investors participate in a unified
investment enterprise. 5 4 This seems to postulate a buyer's market in
securities, in which the single investor will have the market power to
demand all necessary material information. It ignores the extent to
which an inexpert single investor may not ask the right questions, or
may not recognize a fraudulent, but reassuring response. In reality, a
single investor may have an even greater need for disclosure. In the
event of fraud, the single investor bears the entire loss alone. The
horizontal test does not take into account the possibility of multiple,
parallel frauds, each involving an investment contract between the
promoter and one investor.
Horizontal commonality is also overly exclusive in its unduly
mechanical reliance on pooling,55 a formal requirement that is largely
irrelevant to the question of whether there is a special need for en-
152. Ronald J. Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More
Meaningful Formula?, 18 W. Res. L. Rev. 367, 373 (1967).
153. See, e.g., Hirk, 561 F.2d at 100-01 (rejecting the investor's argument that a
pooling requirement erodes the remedial potential of the Securities Acts and finding
that the investor's claim failed the pooling requirement).
154. See id.; see also Gordon, supra note 97, at 667 (proposing a multiplicity test,
under which a common enterprise is a profit seeking venture among a promoter and
multiple parallel investors and does not extend to unique, individually negotiated con-
tracts between two parties).
155. See, e.g., Hirk, 561 F.2d at 101 (interpreting Howey as requiring pooling of
funds); see also Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274,278 (7th Cir.) (find-
ing a pooling of funds to be a prerequisite for application of the Securities Acts), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
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hanced disclosure. 5 6 As discussed, this type of bright line indicator
makes the test easily applicable. This may, however, also make the
test easy to evade by a disingenuous promoter who simply maintains
separate bank accounts or who dissipates the investors' contributions
immediately.
Finally, one of the strengths of the horizontal test can be turned into
an argument against it. The horizontal test restricts the application of
the Securities Acts to transactions that closely resemble the scheme at
issue in Howey. The Howey Court, however, provided no authority
for the limitation and emphasized that its goal was to create a liberal
and flexible test that would effectuate the policy of investor protection
inherent in the Securities Acts. 57 The Court recognized the futility of
any attempt to predict the exact form of an investment contract in the
future. The remedial principles of the Securities Acts and the dy-
namic intent of the Howey Court are therefore frustrated by the hori-
zontal test's insistence on confining the holding to its facts.
B. Strict Vertical Commonality
The hallmark of strict, or narrow, vertical commonality' 5s is the
economic relationship between the investor and the promoter. Under
the strict vertical test, a common enterprise exists if the fortunes of the
investor and the promoter are interwoven and mutually dependent. 59
This direct connection between the success of the promoter and the
success of the investor' 60 leads to a corollary requirement that the
risks of the venture be shared.16 1
Strict vertical commonality rejects the requirement of multiple in-
vestors that is inherent in the horizontal test.' 62 Moreover, the strict
vertical test is indifferent as to whether the investors' contributions
are pooled in a single account or distributed on a pro-rata basis.'6
The narrow vertical standard differs from the broad vertical approach
in that the test depends not on the investor's dependence on the pro-
moter,'6 but on the economic parallel between the two parties' risks
156. See Gordon, supra note 97, at 660.
157. SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
158. "Strict" and "narrow" vertical commonality are synonymous terms.
159. Mordaunt v. Incomco, 686 F.2d 815, 817 (9th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 469 U.S.
1115 (1985).
160. See id; Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 461-62 (9th Cir. 1978); see also
SEC v. Goldfield Deep Mines Co., 758 F.2d 459, 463 (9th Cir. 1985) (requiring a
direct correlation between an investor and a promoter).
161. See Brodt, 595 F.2d at 461.
162. See id.
163. Id at 460-61. This distinction, however, may not be so great because the pro-
moter and investor in a strict vertical jurisdiction must pool funds or share profits to
demonstrate the necessary correlation in fortunes. Id.




and rewards. 165 If the fortunes of the promoter and the investor rise
or fall together, the strict vertical test is satisfied.
The strict vertical approach to commonality developed because
some courts found that the horizontal test, with its stringent reliance
on pooling, would exclude transactions in which vulnerable investors
suffered losses at the hands of unscrupulous promoters, merely be-
cause the investors' funds were not pooled. For example, pyramid
sales schemes typically involve a pass-through of contributions from
investors at the bottom of the pyramid to the promoter at its apex.
The investor contributions are never collected in one place, and thus,
despite the existence of fraud and a common investment structure, the
pooling requirement of the horizontal test is unmet.166 Some courts
saw this as contrary to the remedial nature of the Securities Acts and
developed a new form of vertical commonality in response to such
situations.
The Ninth Circuit pioneered the strict vertical test in SEC v. Glenn
W. Turner Enterprises,'67 a case that focused on the expectation of
profits requirement. 68 The common enterprise analysis was confined
to a single footnote,169 which stated, "A common enterprise is one in
which the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and dependent
upon the efforts and success of those seeking the investment or of
third parties.' 70 Despite its conclusory nature, this statement be-
came the cornerstone of investment contract analysis not only for
courts within the Ninth Circuit, but also for many other courts faced
with interpreting the second element of the Howey test.17'
SEC v. R. G. Reynolds Enterprises, Inc. 72 presents a recent applica-
tion of the strict vertical test of commonality. In Reynolds, the de-
fendant raised approximately $2,000,000.00 from 148 small investors
who bought into a "managed account" advertised via the defendant's
radio program and financial newsletter. 7 3 The SEC brought an en-
forcement action alleging fraudulent misrepresentations and a viola-
tion of the registration requirement. 174 The court casually mentioned
that Reynolds deposited the investors' contributions into a single ac-
165. Brodt, 595 F.2d at 461.
166. See, e.g., SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.) (finding




169. Id at 482 n.7.
170. Id
171. See, e.g., Taylor v. Bear Steams & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667, 671 (N.D. Ga. 1983)
(quoting footnote 7 of Turner); Mullis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
492 F. Supp. 1345, 1352 (D. Nev. 1980) (same).
172. 952 F.2d 1125 (9th Cr. 1991).
173. Id. at 1128.
174. Id at 1129.
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count,175 but placed no reliance on the presence ofpooling. Similarly,
the court alluded to the defendant's expertise,176 a critical factor
under the broad vertical test, but did not consider this factor disposi-
tive. Instead, the court focussed on Reynolds's agreement to accept a
percentage of the managed account's assets as a management fee.177
The court found that this arrangement comprised a sufficient link be-
tween the fortunes of the investors and those of the promoter to qual-
ify the transaction as a common enterprise. The scheme in question
was therefore an investment contract to which application of the Se-
curities Acts was appropriate.17
An agent-principal relationship (such as a broker-customer rela-
tionship) will not always qualify as an investment contract under the
strict vertical approach because often the economic fates of the pro-
moter and investor are independent. In the usual context, the pro-
moter will earn a commission regardless of the profits or losses of the
investor. 179 The transaction may not qualify as an investment con-
tract, even if the promoter is paid a commission based on the percent-
age of the profits made by the investor. In Meyer v. Thomas &
McKinnon Auchincloss Kohlmeyer, Inc.,18° for example, the court
held that an investment contract was not present where the promoter
received a percentage of the managed assets, because the investor
could withdraw the profits as they accrued, and, in that event, the pro-
moter would not have shared the profits.18 '
The strict vertical standard answers Professor Coffey's master ques-
tion' 8s with the following paradigm of a security: a transaction in
which the investor and promoter's interrelationship is such that their
fortunes rise or fall together. In other words, if the investor benefits,
so does the promoter. This test exposes for the court's consideration
the relationship between the promoter and the investor. This rela-
tionship is of paramount importance in determining whether the Acts'
policies of enhanced disclosure are necessary to protect the investor.
Strict vertical commonality, while it addresses this critical relation-
ship, is not without shortcomings. This approach is typically consid-
ered more liberal than the horizontal standard for common enterprise,
but there is one area in which it may in fact be more restrictive.
Under the strict vertical approach, the coverage of the Securities Acts
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1128.
177. Id at 1130-31.
178. Id
179. See Mordaunt v. Incomco, 686 F.2d 815, 817 (9th Cir. 1982) ("The element of
this definition that will generally be absent from a commodities futures trading ac-
count is the requirement of a common enterprise."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1115
(1985).
180. 686 F.2d 818 (9th Cir. 1982).
181. Id. at 619.
182. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
1995] 2159
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
may not be extended to fraudulent schemes in which the promoter
does not share in the risks of the venture. This limitation is in contra-
vention of the remedial purposes of the Securities Acts in that com-
mon enterprises among a class of investors will be excluded as long as
the promoter's compensation is not tied to the performance of the
group investment. The strict vertical test alone, therefore, is inade-
quate to ensure that a promoter who risks nothing fully discloses ma-
terial information." 3
C. The Broad Vertical Approach
Broad vertical commonality is the most liberal of the common en-
terprise tests.184 The broad vertical test rejects horizontal commonal-
ity's stringent reliance on pooling. Like the strict vertical test, broad
vertical commonality depends on the relationship between the inves-
tor and promoter. 8 5 Unlike the narrow vertical approach, however,
the broad vertical test is not concerned with the economic interdepen-
dence of the promoter and investor but instead examines the inves-
tor's dependence on the promoter's expertise.' 8 6 Courts adhering to
this view consider whether the investor's realization of profits is inex-
tricably tied to the promoter's effectiveness and skill. Where this
nexus occurs, the broad vertical test of commonality is satisfied. 187
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals developed the broad commonal-
ity standard in SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.18 8 The Koscot
scheme involved another subsidiary of Glenn W. Turner Enter-
prises. 189 The scheme consisted of a multi-level network of independ-
ent distributors, purportedly engaged in the sale of cosmetics, all of
whom were lured by the promise of "galactic profits."'19 Elaborately
scripted "Opportunity Meetings" and "Go-Tours" were the means
used to recruit new participants. Each new participant paid a sum of
money to access the lowest level of the Koscot ladder. 9 ' Once a
member of the organization, the investor ascended the ladder and
earned commissions by convincing others to join the organization." 9
183. In fact, a promoter whose compensation is tied to the performance of the ven-
ture has an incentive to promote the investor's interests and might be therefore less
likely to perpetrate a fraud.
184. See SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 522-23 (5th Cir.
1974); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 478-79 (5th Cir. 1974).
185. See, e.g., Continental, 497 F.2d at 522 (" '[IThe critical factor is not the simili-
tude or coincidence of investor input, but rather the uniformity of impact of the pro-
moter's efforts.'" (quoting Koscot, 497 F.2d at 478)).
186. Id ("[T]he critical inquiry is confined to whether the fortuity of the invest-
ments collectively is essentially dependent upon promoter expertise.")
187. Id
188. 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
189. Id at 475.
190. Id




The SEC sought to enjoin the scheme for violations of the anti-fraud
and registration provisions of the Securities Acts.' 3 Reversing the
district court, the Fifth Circuit held that the promotional pyramid
scheme in Koscot constituted a common enterprise and thus a security
subject to the Acts. 194 The court held that "the requisite commonality
is evidenced by the fact that the fortunes of all investors are inextrica-
bly tied to the efficacy of the Koscot meetings."195 Because the inves-
tor could not successfully recruit new participants outside the
framework of the Go-Tours and Opportunity Meetings, the court
found the necessary dependence on the Koscot organization.1
96
The Fifth Circuit confirmed the applicability of the broad vertical
standard two days later in SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp.," a
case concerning the application of the Securities Acts to discretionary
commodity trading accounts. Citing Koscot, the Fifth Circuit argued
that "the critical inquiry is confined to whether the fortuity of the in-
vestments collectively is essentially dependent on promoter exper-
tise."'19 8 Because the investors relied on the business acumen of the
promoter, the trading accounts qualified as investment contracts
under the resilient approach of the broad vertical test.'99 In the Fifth
Circuit's view, the focus on investor dependence and promoter skill
gives full effect to the remedial purposes of the Securities Acts and the
underlying rationale of the Howey decision."0
Broad vertical commonality seems to be directly related to the pol-
icy of disclosure underlying the Securities Acts. This approach asks
whether the investor is dependent on the future exercise of the pro-
moter's managerial and entrepreneurial effort and skill. This inquiry
is directly relevant to the need for enhanced disclosure.
The broad vertical approach to commonality also is protective of
the investor, because it looks at the relationship of the investor to the
promoter at the time that the investor was induced to enter into the
investment contract. If, at that time, a critical enticement was the pro-
moter's expertise, the "expert" promoter should be held liable if the
scheme turns out to be less than he advertised it to be.
The logical applicability of the broad vertical test, however, is un-
dermined by two analytical flaws. First, the broad vertical test is
largely duplicated by the other prongs of the Howey test Broad verti-
cal commonality is probably always present whenever the first, third,
and especially the fourth prongs of the Howey analysis are met20°
193. Id. at 474.
194. Id. at 478-79.
195. Id. at 479.
196. Id
197. 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974).
198. Id. at 522.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 522-523.
201. See Gordon, supra note 97, at 665.
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Whenever there is an investment of money with the expectation of
profits to come solely from the efforts of others, the investor probably
also relies on the expertise of the promoter. For example, if an inves-
tor with no previous experience in the industry were to invest money
in a cattle-feeding scheme, and were doing so with the intention of
receiving profits from the efforts of the feedlot managers, that inves-
tor would be automatically dependent on the feedlot managers' exper-
tise.2°0 The test therefore appears to have no independent
significance.
The second problem with the broad vertical test is that it is simply
too broad. Because it requires only a commonality of interest be-
tween two parties to a contract, many profit or income-sharing con-
tracts would qualify as securities. 0 3 The Securities Acts are not
meant to be general fraud provisions. Insofar as the broad vertical
approach does not screen any further than the other elements of the
Howey test and does not exclude transactions that do not have the
indicia of securities, it does not answer Professor Coffey's master
question.2 4
While broad vertical commonality standard is the most liberal of the
three tests, 0 5 it can unduly restrict commonality in one circumstance.
The focus on the promoter's expertise, taken to its logical extreme,
would exclude knowledgeable investors who are not entirely depen-
dent on the promoter's skills from the protections of the Acts.2 6 For
example, a metallurgist who invested in a gold refining scheme would
not qualify for the protection of the Securities Acts. This exclusion
rests on the fallacious assumption that knowledge or expertise in an
area shields the investor from any type of fraud. The Securities Acts
were not intended to penalize knowledgeable investors but to protect
all members of the investing public from fraudulent schemes.2 0 7 The
202. These facts are similar to those presented by Long v. Schultz Cattle Co., 896
F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1990).
203. See Gordon, supra note 97, at 665.
204. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
205. For example, the broad vertical test is the only approach to have found a com-
mon enterprise in a broker-customer relationship. See SEC v. Continental Commodi-
ties Corp., 497 F.2d 522-23 (5th Cir. 1974); cf. Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216,222-23 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that horizontal commonal-
ity does not exist unless there also exists some relationship which ties the fortunes of
each investor to the success of the overall venture), aff'd on other grounds, 456 U.S.
353 (1982). Although the broker is technically the agent of the client, courts applying
the broad vertical test have found a common enterprise based upon the broker's
expertise.
206. See Continental, 497 F.2d at 522.
207. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). In Tcherepnin, the Court
emphasized that a broad and expansive scope of the definition of security was neces-
sary to carry out the remedial statutory purposes of the securities laws. Id.; see also
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 687 (1985) (citing the Howey case as
defining a security broadly so as to ensure full and fair disclosure with respect to a
wide range of instruments). "'Tihe reach of the Act does not stop with the obvious
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broad vertical test undermines this goal when it excludes transactions
in which a knowledgeable investor participates. 208
D. The Problem
None of the existing tests is perfectly consistent with the remedial
purposes of the Securities Acts, the rationale underlying the Howey
case, and the expansive jurisprudence developed by the courts regard-
ing the other elements of the investment contract analysis. Different
factual contexts expose the weaknesses of the individual tests. The
single investor is left vulnerable by the horizontal test. The narrow
vertical approach denies protection to an investor in an enterprise in
which the promoter does not share in the risks of the venture. The
broad vertical approach is analytically flawed and will not protect a
knowledgeable investor.
Moreover, the very existence of multiple tests undermines the pur-
poses of the Securities Acts. The appropriate test should be univer-
sally applicable, because in drafting the 1933 and 1934 Acts Congress
recognized that the existing structure of state regulation was inade-
quate in light of the interstate nature of many securities transac-
tions.' ° The Acts were intended to provide a uniform level of
protection on a nationwide basis, and the splintering of the circuits on
the common enterprise issue defeats this end. While distinctions
among jurisdictions are an inevitable result of federalism, Congress in
1933 lifted the regulation of securities out of the realm of purely intra-
state authority precisely because a system of inconsistent standards
had proven ineffective.
Finally, to be effective, a universal test must capitalize on the
strengths of the approaches that have evolved so far. While none of
the existing tests is perfect, each has value as an analytical tool in de-
termining those transactions to which application of the Securities
Acts is appropriate.
IV. THE ExTrEr OF THE SPLTrr AND THE VIEw FROM MID-
DECADE
None of the three approaches to commonality has gained domi-
nance over the other tests. Some courts' exclusive adherence to one
test has crystallized over the years into unquestioning allegiance.
Such entrenchment means that the differences among some courts
have widened over time. For instance, the Third Circuit, which ad-
and commonplace.' "lId at 688 (quoting SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S.
344, 351 (1943)).
208. See SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 481 (9th Cir.), cerl
denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). "The Acts were designed to protect the American public
from speculative or fraudulent schemes of promoters." Id (citing S. Rep. No. 47, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933)).
209. See supra notes 20-37 and accompanying text.
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heres exclusively to the horizontal test,210 has developed a very differ-
ent perspective from the Ninth Circuit, which follows the strict vertical
approach,' and the Fifth Circuit, which pioneered the broad vertical
test.212 A uniform test that brings all these viewpoints into harmony
to create an acceptable national standard would be difficult to
achieve. While this entrenchment is a serious concern, at least those
jurisdictions that have elected an exclusive approach have provided a
degree of predictability for the litigants and business planners within
their authority. A still greater concern is engendered by those district
and circuit courts that have not elected a single approach. The multi-
plicity of available approaches means that the result in a given case
can depend not only on the jurisdiction in which the case is brought
but also on the judge selected to hear the case. Parties in very similar
cases, even within a single circuit or district, can experience very dif-
ferent results depending on such variables. This violates the policies
underlying the existence of a federal regulatory scheme and results in
adjudications that are unprincipled because the applicable standards
are manipulable.
An audit of cases decided within the 1990s clearly indicates that the
Howey test is alive and well-and frequently litigated. A number of
the recent cases were concerned with the construction of the first,
2 1 3
third,214 and fourth215 elements of the Howey test. The common en-
210. See, e.g., Salcer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 682 F.2d 459,
460 (3d Cir. 1982) (refusing to find an investment contract due to lack of pooling).
211. See, e.g., SEC v. Goldfield Deep Mines Co., 758 F.2d 459, 463 (9th Cir. 1985)
("It is not necessary that the funds of investors are pooled; what must be shown is that
the fortunes of the investors are linked with those of the promoters, thereby establish-
ing the requisite element of vertical commonality.").
212. See, e.g., SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 522 (5th Cir.
1974) (noting that the critical inquiry focuses on the expertise of the promoter).
213. See, e.g., Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 940 F.2d 564,
573-74 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that employee contributions to a noncompulsory,
voluntary stock ownership plan could constitute the necessary investment to satisfy
the Howey test).
214. See, e.g., RTC v. Stone, 998 F.2d 1534, 1540 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding that the
holder of enhanced automobile receivables expected to receive specified interest pay-
ments rather than dividends tied to the profitability of the seller, and thus the "expec-
tation of profits" element of the Howey test was unmet); First Citizen Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., N.A., 919 F.2d 510, 516 (9th Cir. 1990)
(retaining the risk capital approach with respect to investment contracts and holding
that loan transaction would be profitable based on interest rate rather than returns).
215. See, e.g., Pamaco Partnership Management Corp. v. Enning, Nos. 93-1858, 93-
1925, 1994 WL 273874, at *8 (4th Cir. June 22, 1994) (examining whether car wash
venture satisfied the final prong of the Howey test); Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d
1115, 1123 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the final element of Howey was unmet); SEC
v. International Loan Network, Inc., 968 F.2d 1304, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (interpret-
ing liberally the "solely from the efforts of others" requirement); McCoy v. Hilliard,
No. 90-5532, 1991 WL 132522, at *8-9 (6th Cir. July 19, 1991) (table reported at 940
F.2d 660) (examining the investor's claim of reliance on the efforts of third parties);
Stewart v. Ragland, 934 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1991) ("This case turns on the
[fourth] element of that definition, the expectation of profits solely from the efforts of
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terprise element also received its share of attention from the federal
courts during this period. The circuits showed no greater consensus as
to the common enterprise test than in prior periods, as recent cases
have supported each of the horizontal, 16 strict vertical,2 7 and broad
vertical218 approaches to commonality. One trend that emerges from
an examination of the recently decided cases is the courts' willingness
and ability to manipulate the standard to reach a desired result.21 9
This manipulation is clearly possible when the court lacks an authori-
tative standard because the court can choose a more or less liberal test
depending on its view of the facts of the case. The same phenomenon
occurs, however, among courts that do adhere to a single standard; the
courts will use the test to reach those transactions to which application
of the Acts will result in what the court perceives as a just outcome.
This type of manipulation may well be consistent with the remedial
purposes of the Acts, as well as the Howey Court's goal of creating a
flexible test. Nonetheless, a type of cognitive dissonance results as the
courts stretch the settled meanings of various concepts to reach the
outcome they perceive as just.
A prime example of this type of stretching is found in McCoy v.
Hilliard. - In McCoy, the Sixth Circuit examined the sale of managed
barge investment programs. 2 The barges were sold either individu-
ally or through limited partnerships and operated as part of a "pool"
of barges in which revenues and expenses were allocated on a pro-rata
basis among the various investors.' By calling a fleet of barges a
"pool" of barges, the court managed to pull the transaction within the
ambit of the Securities Acts.- 3 Implicitly applying the horizontal test,
the promoter or a third party."); Koch v. Hankins, 928 F.2d 1471, 1476-81 (9th Cir.
1991) (reversing a grant of summary judgment because the investor's dependence on
the promoter's efforts was a question of fact); Bailey v. J.W.K. Properties, Inc., 904
F.2d 918, 920 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that a "stumbling block" to a finding of an invest-
ment contract was the final element of the Howey test).
216. See, e.g., Stone v. Kirk, 8 F.3d 1079, 1085 (6th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he horizontal
commonality requirement... means... that funds of two or more investors must go
into 'a common pool from which all may benefit.'" (quoting Newmyer v. Philatelic
Leasing, Ltd., 888 F.2d 385, 394 (6th Cir. 1989)), cert denied, 495 U.S. 930 (1990)).
217. See, e.g., SEC v. Eurobond Exch., Ltd., 13 F.3d 1334, 1339 (9th Cir. 1994)
(noting that it must be shown that the fortunes of the investors are linked with those
of the promoter, establishing vertical commonality).
218. See, e.g., Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1992) (adopt-
ing the analysis set forth in the unpublished decision of Reeder v. Succession of
Palmer, No. 90-3351, (5th Cir. Sept. 27, 1990) (table reported at 917 F.2d 560), which
adhered to broad vertical commonality).
219. See infra notes 220-79 and accompanying text.
220. No. 90-5532, 1991 WL 132522 (6th Cir. July 19, 1991) (table reported at 940
F.2d 660).
221. Id at *1.
222. Id
223. Id at *9.
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the court found such pooling adequate to qualify the scheme as a com-
mon enterprise.224
The Sixth Circuit, in McCoy, approached the common enterprise
problem very differently than did the Seventh Circuit in Wals v. Fox
Hills Development Corp.225 In Wals, the court held that the sale of
condominium interests did not qualify as a security transaction, even
though rental pool arrangements were present in the case.226 The
court found that the rental pool arrangements were individual con-
tracts between each purchaser and the developer.2 27 Because there
was no overarching rental pool arrangement according to which prof-
its would be distributed pro-rata among all purchasers, the court
found that horizontal commonality was not present.2 s This type of
rental pooling arrangement, however, is much closer to the formal
pooling requirement imposed in earlier horizontal commonality cases
than were the fleet of barges involved in McCoy. The difference in
results may turn on the fact that in McCoy the court smelled a scam,
while in Wals, the court attributed the investors' loss to the overall
decline in the real estate market.
Another area in which the courts have exercised discretion is in de-
fining the investment unit within which the commonality is to be eval-
uated. In Stone v. Kirk,2 9 the transaction at issue was a tax shelter
involving joint ventures.230 The business of each joint venture en-
tailed the leasing of master recordings that could be used in the pro-
duction of phonograph records, tapes, and cassettes.231 In the court's
wry estimation, the investments "proved costly.' '232 The plaintiffs lost
the entire amount that they had invested, the anticipated tax benefits
were disallowed, and the IRS demanded penalties and interests on the
overdue taxes. 33 Among other defenses, the promoter claimed that
the scheme lacked the necessary commonality to qualify as a secur-
ity.234 The court noted that the horizontal commonality requirement
had never been adopted by the Supreme Court, but went on to hold
that "the horizontal commonality requirement ... means only that
224. I at *8-9. The primary issue in the case was the reliance by the investors on
the efforts of third parties. The court found that the fourth prong of the Howey test
was satisfied and that the interests in question were securities. Id.
225. 24 F.3d 1016 (7th Cir. 1994).
226. Id. at 1019.
227. See id.
228. Id.
229. 8 F.3d 1079 (6th Cir. 1993).
230. Id at 1081.
231. Id at 1082.
232. Id at 1083.
233. Id
234. Id at 1085; Defendant Kirk argued that the court's decisions in Deckebach v.
La Vida Charters, Inc., 867 F.2d 278 (6th Cir. 1989), and Curran v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 456
U.S. 353 (1982), mandated the imposition of the horizontal commonality requirement.
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funds of two or more investors must go into 'a common pool from
which all may benefit.' ,z Because each of the joint ventures had
multiple investors, and funds from a common pool were to be used to
exploit a master recording for the benefit of all the venturers, the
court found that the case presented the requisite commonality.23 The
court drew no distinction between the common interests shared be-
tween the members of the limited partnerships and the commonality
shared by the investors in the larger scheme. It therefore analyzed the
common enterprise element with reference to the larger investment
unit, as had the court in Milnarik v. M-S Commodities. Inc.3" Unlike
the Milnarik court, however, the Stone court did not find this larger
unit to be a stumbling block to a conclusion that the case presented an
investment contract.
In DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Hill, Farrer & Burrill.238 the same type of
investment-within-investment structure was analyzed under the nar-
row vertical test. There, the Ninth Circuit reviewed a scheme whereby
money was raised by means of limited partnerships for investment in a
larger venture, the Leighton corporations.239 Reversing the district
court, the Ninth Circuit held that there existed a direct correlation
between the Leighton scheme corporations and the monies received
from the limited partnerships.' Because their fortunes were clearly
linked, the court held that the requisite strict vertical commonality
was established.24 ' The Stone and DCD courts, then, applied different
tests to very similar factual situations and yet reached the same
outcome.
When a court felt that justice so required, the strict vertical standard
has also proved malleable. In SEC v. Eurobond Exchange, Ltd.,24
the SEC brought an action against the president of an investment
company, who sold to American investors certain interest-bearing for-
eign treasury bonds issued by various governments.24 3 These bonds
were purchased in large part with foreign currency loans carrying
much lower interest rates than those received on the bonds.2' The
court affirmed the applicability of the strict vertical approach to the
common enterprise test, holding that "'[i]t is not necessary that the
funds of investors are pooled; what must be shown is that the fortunes
235. Stone, 8 F.3d at 1085 (quoting Newmyer v. Philatelic Leasing, Ltd., 888 F.2d
385 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 930 (1990)).
236. Id. at 1086.
237. See supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
238. No. 90-55523, 1991 WL 159472 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 1991) (table reported at 942
F.2d 791).
239. Id. at *1.
240. Id. (citing SEC v. Goldfield Deep 1Mines Co., 758 F.2d 459, 463 (9th Cir.
1985)).
241. Id.
242. 13 F.3d 1334 (9th Cir. 1994).
243. Id at 1336.
244. Id. This differential was to be the source of the scheme's profitability.
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of the investors are linked with those of the promoters, thereby estab-
lishing the requisite element of vertical commonality.' "245 The de-
fendant, however, contended that his company's compensation was
not paid from investor profits, but rather up front, and that therefore
the requisite commonality was lacking. 46
The court nonetheless found that there was a common enterprise,
based on two factors. First, a certain defined surplus from the scheme,
if realized, was to belong to Eurobond under the terms of the agree-
ment.2 47 Second, and more importantly, the investor and Eurobond
shared the risk of loss. 4 If the foreign governments were to default
on the bonds, Eurobond and the investors would lose whatever profits
they gained from the bonds purchased with foreign currency loans. 924
As for loans from Eurobond itself, the investors were advised that "if
[Eurobond] defaults, you could lose a pro rata portion your invest-
ment. '250 The court therefore held that the investor's success corre-
sponded to the financial stability of Eurobond, and the requisite
commonality was present.25'
Oddly enough, it was a court applying the most liberal of the three
tests that was the exception to this trend of malleability. In Guidry v.
Bank of LaPlace,5 2 the Fifth Circuit addressed a scheme whereby the
"investors" would provide the promoter (or scam artist, as the case
may be) with funds to purchase large blocks of airline tickets for
groups taking gambling trips to Las Vegas. 53 The promoter indicated
that certain Las Vegas hotels would reimburse him for the tickets and
pay him a commission.2 54 Each victim gave the promoter a check, and
in return the promoter provided two checks, both post-dated one
month later. 55 One check was for the amount of the victim's check,
and the other represented the victim's return on that amount.- 6 The
federal securities claims were dismissed based on failure to satisfy the
expectation of profits prong (the third element of the Howey test), 5 7
but the case appears to support the Fifth Circuit's continuing adher-
ence to the broad vertical commonality test. Interestingly, the case
245. Id. at 1339 (quoting Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 460 (9th Cir. 1978)).
246. Idt




251. Id. (citing United States v. Carman, 577 F.2d 556, 563 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding
that where an investor's avoidance of loss depends on the promoter's sound manage-
ment and continued solvency, a common enterprise exists)).
252. 954 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1992).
253. Idt at 281.
254. Itt
255. Itt
256. Itt The returns ranged between four and seven percent per month for various
contributions, but each individual return was for a specific and non-variable amount,
as represented by the second post-dated check. Idt at 281 n.2.
257. Id at 284.
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belies the assertion of some of the broad vertical test's critics that any-
thing qualifies as a security under that test. In this case, the promoter
committed an undoubted fraud, s8 but the Securities Acts were held
not to apply.
A second phenomenon that can be distilled from the current crop of
cases is a tendency for courts to hold investment promoters to their
word. Promoters who advertise a scheme as an investment and then
attempt to defend a suit by pleading lack of commonality have not
met with success. The courts again appear willing to stretch the appli-
cable test to reach a just result.
In Teague v. Bakker,-59 for example, the Fourth Circuit dealt with
the collapse of the empire of television evangelist James Bakker. In
particular, the court evaluated the status of the sale of "lifetime part-
nerships" ("LTPs") entitling the purchasers to a short annual stay at a
vacation retreat constructed by PTL ("Praise the Lord" or "People
that Love"). 60 The primary issue in the case was whether the pur-
chasers made their investment with an expectation of profits to come
solely from the efforts of others.261 The court held that the distribu-
tion of profits to the partners in the LTP scheme on a pro-rata basis
was sufficient to meet the horizontal test- and that the court there-
fore did not have to reach the issue of whether some form of vertical
commonality would satisfy the second prong of the Howey test.23
This distribution of profits (in the form of appreciation in the value of
the investors' stay at the resort) strays from the orthodox concept of a
pro-rata allocation of returns.? The court's decision to hold Bakker
and his cohorts liable for the offer and sale of unregistered, non-ex-
empt securities appears in part to have been motivated by the fact that
Bakker touted the Lifetime Partnerships as a great investment in his
solicitation pamphlets."
Another hyperbolic promoter got his comeuppance in SEC v. R.G.
Reynolds Enterprises, a case in which the SEC brought an action
against the promoters of an investment and gold buying program."6
The defendant, an investment adviser with a radio and television talk
show, through his wholly owned corporation, offered and sold an in-
258. The key player was sentenced to 15 years in prison after pleading guilty to
charges stemming from the scheme. Id. at 280.
259. 35 F.3d 978 (4th Cir. 1994).
260. Id at 981.
261. Id at 986.
262. Id. at 986 n.8.
263. Id
264. Among other unusual features, the investors' returns were not distributed to
them at all. If the profits were measured by the appreciation in value of the investor's
annual stay, that appreciation was inextricably linked to the PTL property.
265. Bakker, 35 F.3d at 983.
266. 952 F.2d 1125 (9th Cir. 1991). Reynolds is discussed above as a case exemplify-
ing the strict vertical test of commonality. See supra text accompanying notes 172-78.
267. Reynolds, 952 F.2d at 1127-28.
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vestment program that he-variously called a "Managed Account," a
"discretionary account," the "30% Net Investment Program," and the
"Loan Program." 268 The investment was made in cash, and the inves-
tor was promised a high rate of return.269 Reynolds also marketed
interests in a gold ore refining venture. Investors received for a single
price a sales contract, a refining contract, and a security agreement 270
The court found that the transaction presented a common enter-
prise.271 The common enterprise analysis followed a lengthy exposi-
tion of Reynolds's inflated promises, suggesting that the court was
holding Reynolds accountable for hyping the ventures as
"investments. 272
Finally, the absence of an authoritative standard within particular
circuits or districts continues to undermine certainty in both litigation
and business planning. In Revak v. SEC Realty Corp.,273 condomin-
ium purchasers brought suit against the sellers of the property, alleg-
ing that non-disclosure of a gas well on the property and other
discrepancies in the closing documents constituted federal securities
fraud.274 The Second Circuit defined horizontal commonality as
"'[tying] the fortunes of each investor in a pool of investors to the
success of the overall venture' ",275 and found the test unmet in the
case before it.2 76 The court further noted, however, that it had "not
previously considered whether vertical commonality (strict or other-
wise) satisfie[d] the common enterprise requirement of the Howey
test. '2 77 The court found that there was nothing in the record of the
case to indicate that the fortunes of the condominium purchasers were
interwoven with the promoter's fortunes so as to support a finding of
strict vertical commonality. On that basis, it declined to decide
whether the strict vertical test could be applied in the Second Cir-
cuit.278 The court did explicitly reject the broad vertical test, appar-
ently applied by the district court, on the grounds that this test
collapsed the second and fourth prongs of the Howey test into one
standard.279
268. Id. at 1128.
269. Id. Reynolds raised approximately $2 million from 148 investors in several
states through the Managed Account. Reynolds deposited the funds in a single ac-
count and used a large portion of the funds to pay for air time for his shows, to
gamble in Las Vegas, and to pay his fiancee's rent, car and other personal expenses.
Id.
270. Id. at 1129.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 172-78.
272. Reynolds, 952 F.2d at 1127-29.
273. 18 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 1994).
274. Id. at 83.
275. Id. at 87 (quoting Hart v. Pulte Homes of Michigan Corp., 735 F.2d 1001, 1004
(6th Cir. 1984)).






Forty-nine years after the Howey decision, the situation is not just
confusion but chaos. Neither offerors nor purchasers can be certain of
the rule that applies to their transaction and therefore neither are able
to plan their activities. Litigation is a roll of the dice in those districts
which do not consistently apply a single commonality standard. More-
over, parties who sue in a district court with a consistent standard still
run the risk that an undecided circuit may choose their case to an-
nounce an authoritative test which overrules the district court ap-
proach. Courts are attempting to fulfill the remedial purposes of the
Acts to do justice in particular cases, but are forced to twist both
words and concepts to do so.
V. A PROPOSAL THAT THE SUPREME COURT MANDATE THE
APPLICATION OF A UNIVERSAL, HYBRID TEST
Although Justice White urged his fellow Justices to settle the com-
mon enterprise controversy "[i]n light of the clear and significant split
in the Circuits,"1 8° to date the Supreme Court has declined to do so.
The Securities Acts themselves were created out of a perception that a
national standard was critical to the protection of the public from
fraudulent and worthless securities.28 The Supreme Court's refusal
to create an authoritative definition of a common enterprise frustrates
this end.
Further, if the applicable test were able to give effect to the pur-
poses underlying the Securities Acts as well as the linguistic and ana-
lytical framework of the Howey decision, the test would enable the
courts to reach those transactions to which application of the Acts is
appropriate. Achievement of this objective would free courts from
the necessity of stating that black is white, an exercise in which the
courts currently engage when the facts of a case require it.38
Finally, the lack of a universal standard makes it impossible for in-
vestors and promoters to assess the likely consequences of their busi-
ness activities. A host of implications flow from the determination
that a transaction is governed by the Securities Acts.23 It is funda-
mentally unfair to hold individuals liable when their actions would not
have been covered by the Acts at all, and certainly not violative of the
Acts, if only they had drawn a different judge in the courthouse lot-
tery or if the plaintiff had elected to sue in a different forum. Con-
versely, although the circumstances of their cases are identical, one
plaintiff's injuries may be addressed while another is left without a
280. Mordaunt v. Incomco, 469 U.S. 1115, 1117 (1985) (White, J., dissenting).
Three justices dissented from the denial of this certiorari petition. According to
Supreme Court procedure, if any four justices vote in favor of certiorari, the case is
accepted.
281. See supra notes 20-37 and accompanying text.
282. See supra part IV.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
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remedy. A single test is required, if the business community is not to
be faced with "[the] daunting... prospect that parties to a transaction
may never know whether they are covered by the [Securities] Acts
until they engage in extended discovery and litigation. ''284
The justification for the inclusion of a catch-all category of "invest-
ment contracts" within the Securities Acts is that occasions will arise
in which the policy considerations of the Acts must be given effect if
the investing public is to be protected. Where an unusual transaction
is involved, however, the scheme may not fit into one of the more
traditional categories of securities. The Howey test, and the common
enterprise element, must therefore be expansive enough to reach
novel or ingenious instruments and limited enough to ensure that the
Securities Acts do not act as a general proscription of fraud in any
context. The test, and its subsections, must serve to identify those cap-
ital-seeking transactions to which application of the Securities Acts is
particularly fitting.
Commonality must mean something. It must in some sense limit
qualifying transactions, but it must not serve to hinder the remedial
purposes of the Acts. Black's Law Dictionary defines "common" as,
inter alia, that which is "shared among several. 2 8 5 Logically, a com-
mon enterprise is an enterprise that is shared among more than one
individual. Realistically, it may be common in two ways: it may be
shared among a group of investors or it may be common to an inves-
tor and a promoter who share the risks associated with the venture.
In either case, the requisite commonality should be found.28 6 To ex-
press a preference for one type of sharing over the other would be to
impose an alien policy choice, to undermine the broad remedial pur-
poses of the Securities Acts,287 and to misconstrue the intentionally
expansive holding in Howey.32
The courts in every circuit therefore should apply a two-step test in
determining whether the transaction at issue in a particular case satis-
fies the common enterprise element of the Howey test. First, the
court should examine whether the pooling required by the horizontal
test is present. If the required pooling or pro-rata sharing is not
284. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 696-97 (1985); cf. Marine
Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 559 n.9 (1982) (rejecting the argument that the certifi-
cate of deposit at issue was transformed, chameleon-like, into a security once it was
pledged).
285. Black's Law Dictionary 188 (abr. 6th ed. 1991).
286. See Hocking v. Dubois, 839 F.2d 560, 567 (9th Cir. 1988) ("When we embraced
vertical commonality... we did not state that we intended to replace horizontal with
vertical commonality; rather, we broadened the meaning of common enterprise be-
yond the 'strict pooling requirement' used by other circuits. In other words, we sim-
ply added an additional means of establishing a common enterprise, which comes into
play only when there is no pooling of funds by several investors in a venture.") (cita-
tion omitted).
287. See supra notes 20-37 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
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demonstrated or if the case involves only a single investor, the court
should proceed to consider whether the strict vertical test is satisfied,
that is, whether the fortunes of the investor correlate with the fortunes
of the promoter. If either of the two tests are met, the court should
conclude that the case presents a common enterprise, and if the re-
maining elements of the Howey test are met, the court should apply
the Securities Acts.
The proposed hybrid test has the value of uniformity.m The char-
acterization of a transaction as a security raises questions of law and
fact, but the ultimate issue of whether or not a particular set of facts is
an investment contract is a question of law.'90 The courts therefore
require a meaningful standard, applicable to each one of the many
transactions that come before them, that will give effect both to the
intentionally broad holding of the Howey Court 291 and the remedial
purposes which underlie the federal Securities Acts.2 Leaving each
circuit or district court to develop its own standard frustrates the in-
tent of the Securities Acts to create a nationwide system of regulation
precisely because inconsistent local laws had proven inadequate to
protect the public from deception. 293
The hybrid test also avoids limitations inherent in either test applied
singly." 4 By requiring courts to look first at the pooling or pro-rata
sharing of profits or losses and then at the correspondence of pro-
moter and investor fortunes, the analysis does not stop at the formal,
mechanical factor. The application of the narrow vertical test will al-
289. In this, it differs from those courts which have on an ad hoc basis applied one
or another of the commonality tests to an individual case. The hybrid test would
require that every court in every case examine the transactions before it for both
horizontal and strict vertical commonality.
290. United States v. Carman, 577 F.2d 556, 562 (9th Cir. 1978).
291. SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
292. See id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933)). The Con-
gressional purpose in enacting this legislation was to protect investors by "compelling
full and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of 'the many types of instruments that
in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security.' " Id. (quoting
H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933)). As Professor Seligman notes:
The new law [referring to the Securities Act of 19331 will also safeguard
against the abuses of high-pressure salesmanship in security flotations. It
will require full disclosure of all the private interests on the part of those
who seek to sell securities to the public. The Act is thus intended to correct
some of the evils which have been so glaringly revealed in the private ex-
ploitation of the public's money.
Seligman, supra note 24, at 38 (quoting 2 The Public Papers and Addresses of Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt 213-14 (1938)).
293. See supra notes 20-37 and accompanying text.
294. Interestingly, the Ninth and the Second Circuits, jurisdictions representing the
largest securities markets in the United States, have found reliance on a single ex-
isting test inadequate. The Second Circuit has responded by declining to adopt an
authoritative standard. See supra notes 273-79 and accompanying text. The Ninth
Circuit has taken a slightly different approach, choosing to examine each transaction
under both tests. See Hocking v. Dubois, 839 F.2d 560, 567 (9th Cir. 1988).
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low courts to examine the entanglement of the promoter with the in-
vestors, which is surely relevant to a determination of whether such
investors merit or require the protection of the securities laws. On the
other hand, consideration of the tests in conjunction ensures that the
mere fact that a promoter does not share in the risks of an enterprise
will not disqualify a venture in which the investors' fortunes are
closely tied, one to another.
The proposed hybrid standard completely excludes broad vertical
commonality. While factors inherent in the broad vertical approach,
such as promoter expertise and investor dependence, are among the
policies driving the Securities Acts, these factors are tested by the
other elements of the Howey test. The common enterprise test there-
fore need not duplicate that screening.
CONCLUSION
The controversy as to the appropriate test of the common enter-
prise element might seem to be of merely technical or semantic con-
cern. Nothing could be further from the truth, as a pair of
hypothetical instances will illustrate.
First, consider the case of Mr. Pennystock, a widower living on a
fixed income. Mr. Pennystock falls into the hands of an unscrupulous
promoter, who convinces him to attend a lecture on how senior citi-
zens can stretch their social security checks. The meeting functions
like a revivalist camp, with person after person standing up and de-
claring that selling the promoter's water filtration system for just a few
hours a week doubled or tripled their income. The participants boast
of new cars, new houses, and luxurious vacations. Mr. Pennystock is
hooked and pays over the required sum of money to become a mem-
ber of the scheme. The promoter who lured him in pockets a commis-
sion. In return for his investment, Mr. Pennystock receives free
instruction in the organization's "foolproof" sales methods, a set of
water filtration equipment, and, more importantly, the right to earn
commissions himself by enticing prospective members to come to a
meeting. Mr. Pennystock, however, has the misfortune to be at the
bottom of this pyramid scheme at a time when the credulous popula-
tion of the area has been fully exploited. He is unable to sell any of
the water filtration systems and he cannot lure in any new recruits.
He would like to sue the organization under the Securities Acts based
on its fraudulent promises, but his opportunity for recovery is frus-
trated by the fact that the applicable jurisdiction has adopted the hori-
zontal test as the exclusive measure of a common enterprise. Because
Mr. Pennystock's contribution has never been pooled with those of his
fellow dupes, the water filtration scheme is not a common enterprise
under the horizontal test. Mr. Pennystock is therefore denied a rem-
edy under the Securities Acts.
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Mr. Pennystock's lawsuit would have been viable in the jurisdiction
in which Ms. Easymark is eligible to sue. Ms. Easymark's jurisdiction
accepts the strict vertical test of commonality. Ms. Easymark, how-
ever, has not invested in the water filtration enterprise. Instead, she
joins with several coworkers in opening a discretionary trading ac-
count. Ms. Easymark and her fellow investors execute powers of at-
torney giving the broker full authority to trade on their behalf as he
sees fit. Each investor's return is dependent on the overall perform-
ance of the account. The broker, however, does not share in the risks
of the transaction, because his commission is not dependent on the
profits of the investors. When the investors discover that the broker
has bled the account dry, they seek to recover under the Securities
Acts. The absence of a link between their fortunes and those of their
disingenuous broker, however, is fatal in a strict vertical jurisdiction.
Ms. Easymark, like Mr. Pennystock, is out of court because the trans-
action in which she invested does not constitute a common enterprise.
Both Mr. Pennystock and Ms. Easymark fit the model of the inves-
tor that Congress intended the Securities Acts to protect by means of
the investment contract instrument. Each had undertaken an eco-
nomic risk in making the investment.29" Each expected that invest-
ment in the enterprise, which had been represented to be
extravagantly successful, would yield a profit.2" Finally, each lacked
the capacity individually to achieve a return on his or her
investment.297
This, then, is a question of real justice for real people. The Supreme
Court must address this issue to resolve the current imbalances. To
give effect to the remedial purposes of the Securities Acts and to be
consistent with the holding in Howey, the Court should require that in
every case before the federal courts a uniform, hybrid test be applied.
Under this test, transactions presenting the indicia of either strict ver-
tical commonality or horizontal commonality will be subject to the
provisions and protections of the Securities Acts.
295. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 108-19 and accompanying text.

